XSEDE Science Gateway Security Policy and Guideline by XSEDE Security Working Group
	  	   	  	   Version	  0.3.2	  (Dec.	  11,	  2013)	  
	  
XSEDE	  Science	  Gateway	  Security	  Pol-­‐
icy	  &	  Guideline	  
Introduction	  “Community	  user”	  logins	  present	  special	  accounting	  and	  security	  issues.	  This	  policy	  is	  designed	  to	  ensure	  that	  such	  users	  and	  logins	  are	  properly	  tracked	  and	  identified	  within	  the	  add-­‐user	  proc-­‐ess.	  
Background:	  Science	  Gateways	  and	  Community	  Users	  The	  XSEDE	  allocations	  process	  permits,	  and	  the	  XSEDE	  science	  gateways	  activities	  encourage,	  activities	   whereby	   entire	   research	   communities	   use	   XSEDE	   resources.	   The	   allocation	   for	   these	  communities	   is	  overseen	  by	  a	  project	  PI,	  but	   the	  precise	  number	  and	   identity	  of	   the	   investigators	  using	  the	  allocation	  may	  not	  be	  known	  in	  advance	  by	  the	  project	  PI,	  and	  in	  most	  cases,	  the	  project	  uses	  a	  portal	  or	  gateway	  interface	  to	  provide	  access	  to	  XSEDE	  resources	  by	  this	  community.	  	  The	  allocations	  policy	  [1]	  states:	  	  
“Gateways	  or	  Community	  Services:	  Projects	  of	  this	  type	  provide	  services	  to	  a	   large	  community	  of	  users	  
who	  are	  typically	  not	  directly	  collaborating	  with	  the	  project	  PI.	  An	  example	  of	  such	  a	  project	  would	  be	  an	  
application	   portal	   service	   providing	   access	   to	   software	   and	   computer	   time	   to	   a	   community	   of	   biology	  
researchers	  via	  a	  web-­‐based	  interface.	  Requests	  to	  provide	  such	  a	  service	  must	  describe	  the	  details	  of	  the	  
services	  provided,	  the	  methods	  used,	  the	  expected	  consumption	  of	  resources,	  and	  mechanisms	  for	  moni-­‐
toring	  the	  users	  and	  usage	  of	  the	  service.	  Statistics	  of	  community	  usage	  should	  be	  reported	  quarterly	  and	  
in	  renewal	  requests	  for	  resources,	  progress	  reports,	  and	  end-­‐of-­‐project	  reports	  .”	  	  This	  community	  user	  account	  policy	  document	  details	   the	  responsibilities	  and	  procedures	   for	  the	  XSEDE	  accounting	  system.	   It	   includes	  security	  recommendations	   for	  service	  providers.	   It	  also	  describes	   the	  responsibilities	  of	  and	  capabilities	  provided	  to	  allocated	  community	  services	  or	  sci-­‐ence	  gateway	  projects.	  
Responsibilities	  and	  Procedures	  
XSEDE	  Accounting	  System	  The	  XSEDE	  accounting	  system	  responsibilities	  include	  (a)	  permitting	  the	  creation	  of	  such	  com-­‐munity	  user	  logins	  within	  10	  business	  days	  and	  (b)	  identifying	  those	  users	  in	  a	  uniform	  manner	  so	  that	  security	  and	  accounting	  needs	  can	  be	  met.	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When	  applying	  as	  a	  science	  gateway	  [2]	  the	  applicant	  may	  request	  a	  community	  account.	  	  When	   a	   community	   user	   request	   is	   submitted,	   the	   PI/Allocation	   Manager	   will	   create	   a	   user	  login.	  	  
• Per	  IGTF	  certificate	  guidelines,	  distinguished	  names	  must	  either	  be	  for	  real	  people	  or	  fully	  qualified	  domain	  names	  (FQDNs).	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  no	  first	  and	  last	  name,	  but	  instead	  the	  gateway	  FQDN	  is	  used	  for	  the	  DN	  and	  display	  name	  in	  the	  local	  password	  files.	  These	  will	  be	  of	   the	   format	  $NAME.gateway.xsede.org	  and	  assigned	  by	  XSEDE	  staff.	  A	  single	  community	  account	  can	  have	  multiple	  FQDNs	  for	  test,	  development	  and	  other	  purposes.	  
• The	  contact	  information	  (email,	  phone,	  address)	  for	  the	  community	  user	  will	  be	  the	  gateway	  or	  project	  contact	  with	  primary	  oversight	   for	  the	   login	  (i.e.	   the	  PI).	  The	  gateway	  form	  will	  also	  allow	  entry	  of	  a	  primary	  administrative	  contact	  (if	  different	  from	  the	  PI).	  	  Once	  created,	   the	  XSEDE	  accounting	  system	  will	   treat	  a	  community	  user	  as	   it	  would	  treat	  any	  other	   individual—assign	   the	   user	   to	   resources,	   permit	   usage	   uploading	   from	   assigned	   resources,	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  gateway	  or	  community	  project	  contact	  will	  be	  able	  to	  monitor	  usage	  by	  this	  “user”	  via	  the	  standard	  tools	  available	  to	  all	  users	  (e.g.,	  xdusage	  or	  user	  portal).	  
Service	  Providers	  Community	  accounts	  allow	  access	  to	  XSEDE	  resources	  through	  different	  means	  than	  command	  line	  logins	  by	  individuals.	  While	  community	  accounts	  can	  provide	  more	  secure	  access	  to	  XSEDE	  ma-­‐chines	  through	  a	  fully	  secured	  gateway	  server,	  the	  web	  interfaces	  often	  used	  and	  the	  large	  number	  of	  end	  users	  can	  introduce	  potential	  security	  risks.	  Service	  providers	  (SPs)	  are	  not	  required	  to	  place	  additional	  constraints	  on	  community	  accounts,	  but	  if	  they	  choose	  to	  do	  so,	  a	  uniform	  approach	  will	  make	  development	   easier	   for	   gateway	  programmers	  using	  multiple	   sites.	   For	   this	   reason	   the	   fol-­‐lowing	  recommendations	  are	  made.	  	  The	  common	  set	  of	  recommended	  restrictions	  below	  has	  been	  developed	  jointly	  by	  XSEDE’s	  se-­‐curity	  and	  gateway	  working	  groups.	  
Login	  Ability	  If	  a	   service	  provider	  does	  not	  allow	  gateway	  developers	   to	   log	   in	  directly	   to	  a	  community	  ac-­‐count,	  the	  Unix	  “substitute	  user”	  or	  sudo	  access	  is	  recommended	  to	  allow	  a	  restricted	  set	  of	  devel-­‐opers	  to	  “sudo”	  into	  the	  community	  account	  for	  command	  line	  access	  and	  interactive	  development.	  Adding	  these	  developers	  to	  a	  distinct	  Unix	  group	  would	  be	  an	  additional	  benefit	  for	  gateway	  devel-­‐opers.	   In	   this	  way,	  developers	  could	  write	   to	  community	  software	  areas	  with	   the	   tools	   to	  be	  exe-­‐cuted	  by	   the	   gateway	   account,	   and	  with	  properly	   set	   permissions	   the	   gateway	   account	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  modify	  the	  tools	  but	  just	  run	  them.	  Combined	  with	  a	  form	  of	  command	  restriction,	  such	  as,	  restricted	  shells	  [10]	  that	  could	  be	  setup	  by	  the	  SP,	  these	  restrictions	  can	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  an	  ex-­‐posed	  community	  account	  credential	  to	  be	  abused.	  
Remote	  Job	  Submission	  SPs	  may	  support	  a	  number	  of	  different	  protocols	  for	  remote	  job	  submission.	  Examples	  include	  SSH	  (with	  passwords,	  key	  pairs	  and/or	  GSI	  authentication)	  and	  grid	  software	  such	  as	  Globus	   [3],	  Unicore	  [4]	  and	  Genesis	  II	  [5].	  The	  time-­‐limited	  nature	  of	  grid	  certificates	  used	  by	  GSI-­‐SSH	  and	  grid	  software	  adds	  additional	  security	  beyond	  unrestricted	  key	  pairs	  and	  passwords	  used	  by	  SSH	  if	  only	  short-­‐lived	   certificates	   are	   accepted.	   Furthermore,	   grid	   certificates	   allow	  use	   of	   GRAM	   and	   other	  tools,	  which	  can	  alleviate	  the	  need	  direct	  shell	   login	  with	  the	  community	  accounts.	  If	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  direct	  login	  must	  be	  utilized,	  it	  is	  preferable	  to	  do	  so	  with	  restricted	  ssh	  keys	  that	  only	  allow	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certain	  commands	  to	  be	  executed.	  This	  is	  done	  using	  the	  from	  and	  command	  options	  in	  the	  author-­‐ized_keys	  file	  [9].	  
Community	  Software	  Area	  A	  community	  software	  area	  (CSA)	  gives	  developers	  access	  to	  disk	  space	  for	  the	   installation	  of	  executables	  and	  libraries	  that	  will	  be	  used	  by	  a	  community	  of	  users.	  CSAs	  are	  unpurged,	  backed	  up	  spaces	  accessible	  via	  a	  single	  path	  ($XD_COMMUNITY/my_directory_name)	  on	  all	  requested	  XSEDE	  systems.	  CSAs	  eliminate	  the	  need	  for	  developers	  to	  use	  home	  directories	  to	  install	  shared	  commu-­‐nity	  applications,	  libraries,	  scripts,	  etc.	  Developers	  rather	  than	  XSEDE	  staff	  are	  responsible	  for	  soft-­‐ware	  in	  these	  areas.	  
Gateway	  End-­‐User	  Accounting	  Records	  Science	   gateway	   end-­‐user	   reporting	   is	   required	   of	   both	   science	   gateways	   and	   SPs.	  	  Some	   SPs	  require	  that	  gateways	  capture	  attributes	  and	  send	  them	  with	  job	  records	  to	  SPs.	  	  These	  SPs	  are	  then	  required	   to	   send	   locally-­‐collected	   attribute	   information	   to	   the	   XSEDE	   Central	   Database	   through	  AMIE	  packets.	  Information	  on	  how	  to	  do	  this	  for	  gateway	  developers	  and	  SPs	  can	  be	  found	  at	  [11].	  
Community	  Activities	  and	  Science	  Gateways	  Responsibilities	  of	  a	  PI,	  including	  those	  of	  a	  gateway	  PI,	  are	  described	  in	  the	  Acceptable	  Use	  Pol-­‐icy	  [6].	  The	  gateway	  PI	  accepts	  responsibility	  for	  following	  the	  general	  XSEDE	  user	  policies	  as	  well	  as	  the	  additional	  policies	  in	  this	  document,	  and	  to	  appropriately	  make	  their	  use	  community	  aware	  of	  any	  relevant	  XSEDE	  restrictions,	  such	  as,	  storing	  personally	  identifiable	  information	  or	  personal	  health	  information	  on	  SP	  systems	  without	  prior	  authorization	  from	  the	  SPs	  in	  questions.	  	  It	   is	   recommended	  that	  researchers	  accessing	  science	  gateways	  can	  run	  executables	  provided	  by	  the	  gateway	  developer,	  but	  cannot	  upload	  arbitrary	  executables.	  	  Otherwise	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  for	  the	  gateway	  owner	  to	  attest	  to	  the	  function	  and	  validity	  of	  a	  particular	  job	  and	  thus	  has	  the	  po-­‐tential	  to	  slow	  incident	  investigations	  and	  keep	  the	  community	  accounts	  disabled	  longer.	  	  Community	  accounts	  can	  be	  requested	  at	  the	  XSEDE	  Portal	  and	  may	  be	  done	  as	  part	  of	  the	  de-­‐velopment	  process.	  	  A	  PI	  must	  provide:	  	  
• IP	  address	  or	  DNS	  name	  of	  the	  gateway	  machine.	  
• Current	   estimated	   long-­‐term	  disk	   storage	   requirements	   for	   the	   community	   account.	   	   This	  number	  can	  be	  modified	  in	  the	  future	  to	  accommodate	  gateway	  growth.	  	  Optionally,	  for	  each	  script	  or	  executable	  in	  the	  named	  directory,	  provide	  
• Estimated	  maximum	  number	  of	  processors/nodes	  
• Estimated	  maximum	  run	  time	  
• Estimated	  short-­‐term	  storage	  requirements	  per	  user	  per	  job	  	  This	   information	   is	  stored	   in	   the	  XSEDE	  Central	  Database	  and	  associated	  with	  the	  community	  account	  username,	  and	  it	  can	  be	  further	  edited	  as	  development	  proceeds.	  Some	  SPs	  may	  have	  extra	  requirements	  and	  request	  additional	  information	  	  Once	  a	  gateway	  is	  in	  operation,	  for	  all	  jobs	  run	  on	  XSEDE	  a	  PI	  must	  log	  and	  retain	  for	  at	  least	  90	  days	  the:	  
• End	  user’s	  IP	  address	  
• Date	  and	  timestamp	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• End	  user’s	  username	  on	  the	  gateway	  	  Authentication	  and	  access	  control	  is	  important	  for	  any	  account,	  and	  gateways	  differ	  from	  tradi-­‐tional	   single-­‐user	   accounts	   in	   key	  ways.	  While	   gateway	   accounts	   are	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   re-­‐questing	  PI,	  these	  accounts	  are	  shared	  and	  do	  not	  map	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  with	  a	  single	  real	  person.	  There-­‐fore,	  the	  XSEDE	  CA,	  following	  IGTF	  policies,	  does	  not	  issue	  end	  entity	  certificates	  for	  these	  accounts.	  That	  does	  not	  mean	  there	  are	  not	  other	  forms	  of	  certificates	  that	  could	  be	  used	  if	  issued	  by	  an	  IGTF	  accredited	  CA,	  such	  as,	  a	  host	  certificate	  for	  the	  hostname	  issued	  to	  the	  portal	  and	  maintained	  in	  the	  XDCB.	  Related	  to	  this	  there	  are	  some	  guidelines	  regarding	  gateway	  and	  certificate	  usage.	  
• A	  gateway	  should	  be	  run	  on	  a	  dedicated	  host	  (bare	  metal	  or	  VM),	  not	  to	  be	  shared	  with	  other	  services.	  This	   is	   to	  protect	   the	  potentially	   long-­‐lived	  private	  key	  material	  on	   the	  gateway.	  
• A	  gateway	  should	  have	  an	  identified	  party	  with	  root	  access	  to	  the	  gateway,	  and	  this	  per-­‐son’s	  contact	  information	  needs	  to	  be	  kept	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  to	  remain	  .	  
• A	  single	  gateway	  account	  should	  not	  to	  be	  used	  for	  multiple	  gateways.	  This	  is	  to	  reduce	  exposure	  of	  any	  private	  keys	  and	  limits	  the	  scope	  of	  potential	  compromise.	  
• The	  gateway	   server	  FQDN	  should	  match	   that	  of	   the	  FQDN	   in	   the	   certificates,	   gridmap	  file	  and	  form	  submitted	  with	  the	  community	  account	  request.	  Changes	  to	  the	  hostname	  or	  domain	  will	  need	  to	  be	  entered	  manually	  by	  XSEDE	  Accounting	  and	  propagated	  from	  the	  XDCB	  to	  the	  SPs	  through	  AMIE.	  
• A	  gateway	  should	  never	  transfer	  private	  key	  material	  over	  a	  network.	  	  Additional	   recommendations	  on	  secure	  practices	   for	  gateway	  developers	  are	  provided	  on	   the	  gateway	  link	  from	  http://www.xsede.org	  and	  in	  [12].	  	  
Additional	  Security	  Considerations	  Community	   user	   logins	   present	   special	   security	   considerations	   and	   thus	   dictate	   the	   need	   for	  this	  policy.	  	  	   The	  primary	  requirement	  from	  the	  security	  working	  group	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  SPs	  are	  notified	  of	  the	   creation	   of	   such	   community	   user	   logins	   and	   that	   the	   information	   requested	   in	   section	   2.3	   is	  provided.	  	  Potential	   security	   risks	   have	   been	   identified	   in	   at	   least	   two	   Teragrid-­‐funded	   studies.	   A	   2008	  Risk	  and	  Vulnerability	  Assessment	  conducted	  by	  the	  security-­‐wg	  [7]	  identifies	  the	  following	  risks	  to	  the	  XSEDE	  (then	  TeraGrid)	  from	  Science	  Gateways:	  
• Because	   all	   jobs	   from	   the	   gateway	   are	   submitted	   as	   the	   same	   user,	   if	   there	   is	   a	   security	  problem,	  XSEDE	  cannot	  tell	  which	  Gateway	  User	  committed	  the	  offense	  (This	   is	  why	  gate-­‐ways	  are	  required	  to	  maintain	  audit	  logs,	  mapping	  job	  submission	  to	  specific	  people.)	  
• If	  a	  gateway	  becomes	  compromised,	  the	  Gateway	  User	  could	  get	  a	  shell	  and	  attempt	  internal	  attacks	  on	  XSEDE.	  (This	  can	  be	  mitigated	  by	  using	  ssh	  keys	  with	  a	  restricted	  set	  of	  executa-­‐bles	  in	  the	  authorized_keys	  file	  options	  [9].)	  
• If	  gateways	  allow	  their	  users	  to	  upload	  unvetted	  code,	  it	  may	  be	  malicious	  or	  run	  poorly	  and	  consume	  unneeded	  resources.	  (This	  can	  be	  mitigated	  on	  the	  Gateway	  end	  by	  only	  allowing	  certain	  tasks	  to	  be	  performed.)	  
• A	  compromised	  user’s	  workstation	  could	  be	  used	  by	  an	  attacker	  to	  log	  into	  the	  Gateway	  im-­‐personating	  the	  user.	  (Damage	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  types	  of	  jobs	  users	  can	  submit	  through	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the	  gateway.)	  	  A	  2010	  paper	   co-­‐authored	  by	  Teragrid	   security	   and	   gateway	   staff	   [8]	   also	   identifies	   compro-­‐mise	  of	   the	  science	  gateway	  server,	  unauthorized	  use	  of	   the	  science	  gateway	  community	  account,	  unauthorized	  command	  and/or	  application	  execution	  on	  an	  SP	  resource	  by	  the	  community	  account	  and	  unauthorized	   replacement	   or	   update	   of	   gateway	   executables	   on	   the	   SP	   resource.	   In	   addition	  community	  account	   authentication	  methods	   (passwords,	  PKI	   credentials,	   SSH	  keys)	  may	  be	   com-­‐promised.	  The	   impact	  of	  credential	  compromise	  will	  vary	  based	  on	  the	   type	  of	  credential,	   its	   life-­‐time,	  and	  its	  corresponding	  capabilities.	  
Resources	  Required	  Information	   entered	   on	   the	   form	   used	   to	   request	   a	   community	   account	   is	   also	   logged	   in	   the	  XCDB.	  	  If	  SPs	  choose	  to	  impose	  the	  account	  restrictions,	  effort	  may	  be	  required	  to	  support	  sudo	  or	  GSI-­‐SSH.	   Gateway	  developers	  may	   see	   an	   increased	   level	   of	   effort	   if	   there	   are	   restrictions	  where	  there	  were	  none	  previously,	  but	  if	  sites	  adopt	  the	  recommendations	  and	  provide	  a	  more	  standard-­‐ized	  set	  of	  restrictions	  development	  efforts	  would	  be	  greatly	  reduced	  for	  developers	  using	  multiple	  sites.	  
Scaling	  This	  policy	  will	   provide	   a	   consistent	  means	   for	   identifying	   community	  users	   and	   thus	   should	  have	   a	   positive	   (though	  minor)	   impact	   on	   scaling.	   This	   policy	   provides	   recommendations	   for	   ac-­‐count	  restrictions	  at	  SP	  sites	  and	  so	  can	  improve	  the	  usage	  environment	  for	  gateway	  developers.	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